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ABSTRACT: Toulmin’s original models of argumentation and human reasoning are
reexamined in this paper from the perspective of evolutionary and cognitive theory.
On the basis of recent work done from the biological and adaptationist perspectives in
communication studies, it is to be demonstrated how neo-Darwinian and cognitive
psychology may provide the platform for an understanding of the relationship of
argumentation to human reasoning and communicative faculties. The Toulmin’s
notions of field dependence and independence in argument are then reexamined and
reappraised in light of this approach.
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INTRODUCTION
 
Years ago, as an undergrad, I was in a class seminar dealing with topics
related to technology and society. One of the topics brought up was that
of artificial intelligence: how might a computer develop awareness of
its own intelligent nature, and how might it be able to learn in the same
manner a human child would? It was a question we bandied around,
mostly discussing what sort of built-in heuristic rules would be
necessary for such self-realization and near the end of class, I suddenly
had an insight: maybe a computer would be able to recognize itself as
being intelligent once it had begun to communicate with another,
similar system, and develop from its conversations an awareness of its
own particular cognitive processes as each attempted, through a
heuristic process of trial and error, to ‘persuade’ the other system.
This is, I grant, a simplistic idea, but I bring it up because the
role of communication and argumentation in cognition has not yet
received the thorough attention it has deserved in cognitive science,
although it may be crucial to do so to further understand the nature and
mechanisms of human thought. Argumentation is also a topic which
has thus far been almost completely overlooked by evolutionary
psychologists, although it too could benefit greatly from an
understanding of how knowledge and reasoning is communicated.
Although evolutionary psychology has taken up the task of
understanding human reasoning from an adaptationist stance, it too has
not yet tried to provide a theoretical framework which tries to explain
both how knowledge is communicated through argument and what
form of relationship may have existed between the evolution of those
neurobiological processes responsible for learning and reasoning, and
those responsible for human communication.
When Stephen Toulmin wrote On Human Understanding in
1972, he did not omit the importance of argumentation to the
development of human thinking; he, in fact made it central to a theory
of the evolution and development of conceptual thought as it occurred
through all human intellectual endeavors. Anticipating Richard
Dawkins’s notion of memes by at least several years, Toulmin
expounded the notion that ideas and conceptual structures do not
follow the rigid Kuhnian path of paradigm shifts, but that they instead
develop in a process akin to natural selection in biology, with random
variation in concepts occurring through a process of innovation, and
adaptive selection occurring through the process of argumentation.
Whereas Toulmin had uncovered the basic structures of human
argumentation in The Uses of Argument, in this subsequent text he
demonstrated the role argument played in the evolution of human
knowledge, with argumentation being the mechanism through which
conceptual variation and selection takes place, and through which ideas
succeed or fail.
The use of analogy will only take us so far if we truly wish to
understand the uses and functions of argument within an evolutionary
epistemology, however. While the use of natural selection as a
metaphor for the development of conceptual knowledge through
argumentation may be effective, a true evolutionary model would have
to provide an adaptationist account for the origins and uses of human
argument. Instead of a cultural model, such an adaptationist account
would be best served by a model based in evolutionary psychology
which is able to address certain pertinent questions: Why do we go
through the act of arguing in the first place? What common features
can be discerned across different arguments, regardless of the situation
or milieu where they occur? What might have been the circumstances
which led to the evolution of the cognitive domains which guide
argument, and what adaptive functions might they have or have had?
Are there limits to what an adaptationist model of argument is able to
explain?
These questions will be addressed, if not fully answered, in the
essay which follows. In On Human Understanding, Stephen Toulmin
pondered the question of the existence of universals existing across
human understanding, and how we might be able to explain the
existence of such universals across the easily observable variability and
malleability of human culture. Such an explanation, according to
Toulmin, may eventually be expressed in terms of neurobiology, of
human evolution, or as a function of the ‘common exigencies’ of
human life (Toulmin, 1972, pp. 96-97). It is the goal of this paper to
demonstrate that all three of these possible explanations are valid, and
that they may be used to form a consilience of inductions in explaining
human understanding and its relationship to argumentation.
 
1.THE ORIGINS OF ARGUMENT
 
1.1 Looking backwards
 
Let us now engage in a thought experiment, using the model of
conceptual change which Toulmin set forth. Taking as literally true the
notion that ideas go through the processes of speciation, variation and
mutation (or, as Toulmin calls it, innovation) which together form the
meta-process of evolution, we trace the common lines of the descent of
human knowledge. We go back further and further in time, back to the
emergence of Homo sapiens sapiens, we find ourselves at the
beginning of the cultural evolution of the human species, as well as its
biological evolution. What do we find then? Do we find a ‘Prime
Concept,’ an ancestral meme from which all other ideas and cultural
expressions sprung forth? This is not likely, and I provide this answer
not simply because it would be impossible for us to determine with any
degree of precision what such a primordial concept may have
resembled, but because according to evolutionary psychology the
spontaneous organization of neurobiological components into a fully
functioning heuristic mechanism is an impossibility. Instead, processes
of natural selection and variation occurring over periods of millions of
years are responsible for the development and organization of the
cognitive and communicative traits which are responsible for human
argumentative capacity (Plotkin, 1993; Dunbar, 2000).
Clearly then, we are limited in what we can say about
conceptual evolution if we do not also consider the evolution of the
neurobiological apparatus governing its development. We are further
limited in what we can determine about the emergence of said
apparatus, given the scarcity of the available archaeological evidence,
and the foreknowledge that we will forever be limited in the extent to
which we can surmise the sort of communication and reasoning
patterns which formed part of our earliest ancestors’ everyday lives.
What the archaeological evidence can tell us is approximately when
such cognitive capacities must have emerged, what forms they must
have taken shortly after their emergence, and most importantly why
they emerged at all. This is the supporting evidence which evolutionary
psychologists have used in the development of their scenarios of
mental evolution, and to explain the primary evidence provided by
neurobiological and psychological investigation. Since there has not yet
been sufficient archaeological research to provide clues as to when
argumentation first emerged, and provide insight into what forms it
may have taken, we are currently limited to using existing theories on
the evolution of human reasoning and communicative capacity to
hypothesize on the evolution of argument.
 
1.2 The evolution of human reasoning
 
Any discussion of the evolution of the cognitive faculties responsible
for human argumentative capacity must begin with a discussion of the
evolution of reasoning as a neurobiological feature. Although
argumentation is to a large extent a social activity dependent on
communication between group members, it begins with the reasoning
processes which occur within the human brain, and these processes
have been one of the main objects of study by evolutionary
psychologists. The general consensus among these scholars is that the
particular reasoning skills which appear to be unique to human species
are primarily cognitive adaptations which endowed them with
increased genetic fitness and survival capacity. Where this consensus
ends is what the exact mechanisms of human reasoning are, what were
the factors which led to human reasoning capacity, and to what extent
we can attribute them to natural selection. Samuels (2000) has
identified four common tenets of theories in evolutionary psychology
which its adherents are able to generally agree on. These four tenets
are: the computational view of human information processing;
nativism, or the belief that much human knowledge is innate; an
adaptationist perspective viewing cognitive structures as products of
natural selection; and a massively modular conception of the cognitive
architecture, viewing it as consisting of separate cognitive domains. In
trying to explain argumentation as a product of evolved cognition, we
may find ourselves coming up with several different theories and
scenarios trying to explain this particular reasoning process; they will
still, however, find themselves in agreement on these four basic tenets.
The most well-known and influential evolutionary theory of
human reasoning is probably that put forth by the team of Cosmides
and Tooby, who have argued that human rationality, in as much as
reasoning mechanisms appear to vary across contexts, must be
primarily, if not entirely, adaptive in its nature and origins, and that
human reasoning can only be explained by a massively modular
conception of the mind which regards separate cognitive domains as
having emerged as adaptations to different reasoning situations
(Cosmides and Tooby, 1992, 1994). The theoretical framework
advanced by Cosmides and Tooby has been expanded by other scholars
to explain the relationship between human reasoning and knowledge
faculties (Plotkin, 1993; Papineau, 2000), and to explain strategic
thinking (Morton, 2000). Although this framework has been criticized
by some other scholars working within evolutionary psychology for
being too restrictive in the constraints it places on the human capacity
for creative thought and for being too reductionist in trying to distill
cognition down to modules (Samuels, 2000), it has proven itself to be
parsimonious enough to account for myriad variations of human
reasoning, and it may yet prove itself useful in trying to understand
how reasoning is undertaken through argumentation.
 
1.3 The evolution of human communication
 
As important as theories of human reasoning may be, they do not fully
satisfy our attempt to explain the evolution of argumentation, if we
define it as the process of reasoning and understanding through the
communicative process. We must also critically examine the evolution
of language, symbolicity, and other peculiar human communication
features related to reasoning processes. There have been various
scenarios put forth for the emergence of human linguistic, symbolic
and communicative faculties in which argumentation plays no
uncertain role in the evolution of these particular traits . These include
scenarios where they have evolved as an adaptation in hunting and
tracking (Hewes, 1994), as a means of permitting social exchange and
sharing of food and resources (Hildebrand- 
Nilshon, 1995), and even as having evolved as a means of establishing
dominance and reproductive success in a social group, with the most
effective and persuasive speakers being able to establish themselves at
the top of the social hierarchy, and more likely to propagate their genes
to future generations (Burling, 1988; Smillie,1995). Additionally, there
are also theories of linguistic evolution which make a strong correlation
between cognitive and communicative function, or which maintain that
the primary adaptive function of language acquisition is not as a means
of communication, but as a means of facilitating cognition (Pinker and
Bloom 1990; Origgi and Sperber, 2000). Such theories maintain that
linguistic faculties evolved specifically to facilitate those processes
essential to mutual understanding, by permitting individuals to
communicate intentions and to understand those communicated by
others.
The affinity between language and cognition may then be
viewed as indicative of the relationship between the verbalization of
arguments and their understanding, and further neurophysiological
investigation of the connections between linguistic features and
reasoning may eventually lead to a decisive determination of what the
exact nature of this relationship is. On the basis of the evidence thus far
presented, the remainder of this paper will present the outline of a
tentative evolutionary or adaptationist model of argument, which may,
with the accumulation of new data in the field, be eventually revised or
expanded into a theoretical model with greater explanatory value.
 
2. AN ADAPTATIONIST MODEL OF ARGUMENT
 
2.1 Domain specificity and argument fields
 
One of the key elements which is found across all models based in
evolutionary psychology is the notion of domain specificity, the view
that the mind, as a product of selectionist pressures, is not a general,
all-purpose thinking device, but instead consists of separate domains or
modules, each of which has evolved to perform a specific mental task,
and that the limits of human cognition are internally defined by the
specific functions of individual domains. In contrast to this is the
notion of domain generality, which posits that the brain functions in a
manner analogous to Turing’s Universal Machine, capable of solving
any problem on the basis of a few built-in underlying features. In recent
years, the evidence has pointed more towards domain-specificity as
being an accurate representation of how the mind actually works, and
how cognition is organized, further buttressing the adaptationist
program: with a few exceptions, nearly all evolutionary theories of the
mind are, as is required by the laws of natural selection and adaptation,
modular in nature (Plotkin, 1993, p. 189-190). Not all modular theories
of the mind are adaptationist, however, and domain-generality remains
surprisingly durable among those scholars critical of evolutionary
psychology for ignoring the seeming anomalies in mental processes
and structures not easily explained by adaptationist theory (Samuels,
2000).
This debate between the merits of the domain-specific and
domain-general accounts of cognition bears a striking similarity to both
the distinction Toulmin made between substantive and analytical
argument, and his notions of field dependency and invariance in
argumentation structures. In trying to apply cognitive and evolutionary
theory to the study of argument, we find ourselves dealing with the
same problems Toulmin did nearly fifty years ago, with extremes of
generality and modularity standing in for the extremes of absolutism
and relativism which Toulmin tried to overcome. If we take the neo-
Darwinist account of neurobiological evolution to be true, then there
clearly cannot be an all-purpose human argumentative faculty, as the
ability to reason and build knowledge through communication must
have developed as a result of a process of selection and adaptation to
certain situations where such a cognitive function was beneficial for
survival and reproduction. At the same time, the parsimonious and
flexible nature of argument does not lend itself well to the massive
modularity hypothesis prevalent in evolutionary psychology, and as
noted, the massive modularity hypothesis by itself is not sufficient to
explain the nature of all human cognition, much less argumentation
alone.  
If we are trying to conceive of a theoretical model which will
replace a discredited view which holds that human understanding is
universalist and axiomatic, while trying to avoid an equally untenable
view that our ability is completely modular and entirely based on
adaptations to specific situations, it would be advisable to turn to
Toulmin’s notions of field dependency and invariance, integrating them
into a cognitive perspective on argument. In lieu of an all-purpose
argumentative mechanism which is adapted to the purposes of human
reasoning capacity, what we instead seem to possess is a series of
different modules adapted to specific cognitive functions, which
constitute the basis of the field-dependent components of the different
forms of argumentation which the human organism is capable of
undertaking, as different modules, or different functions of the same
module, will come into play in different communicative situations.
There also exist certain modules which are field-invariant, and which
are an integral part of any argument. Rather than there existing an
‘argumentation module’ per se, I would maintain that the primary such
field-invariant module is the linguistic module identified by Pinker and
Bloom (1990), which, according to them, evolved primarily not as a
means for communication per se, but to facilitate and improve the use
of existing cognitive faculties. As the linguistic module enables the
production of complex expressions of thought and emotion to others of
the same species, and, in turn, allows for such messages to be
understood by their audiences, it clearly plays one of the crucial roles
in the development of human understanding through argument.
The emergence of other cognitive traits intimately associated
with language, such as Theory of Mind, also likely play a crucial in
role in endowing us with the ability to reason through argument.
According to Baron-Cohen (1999) human reasoning, as we know it,
began with the ability to recognize and communicate volitional and
epistemic states permitted by the emergence of Theory of Mind.
Indeed, Dunbar (2000) has maintained that the emergence of Theory of
Mind was a prerequisite for all the forms of higher cognition which are
unique to humans and no other species. While it is not yet known
whether Theory of Mind constitutes a domain separate from that of
language or they are part of the same module, it too appears to have
ben a prerequisite for the emergence of argumentation, and is another
of the field-invariant mental traits which are present across argument
fields.
 
2.2. Testing and evidence
 
The best way to test such a modular theory of argumentation may be
not through the study of the proper use of arguments, but through the
study of their improper use. One of the key subjects of study by
evolutionary psychologists has been our tendency towards fallacious
reasoning, as it helps us to understand the common features of the
heuristic mechanisms behind our reasoning processes, and how they
work without even our being aware of them. Most normal test subjects
fare poorly when they attempt to undertake problem-solving tasks
which are based on determining probabilities, as we are not
biologically hard-wired to do so in a heuristic fashion. What we do in
such situations is make use of the particular heuristic mechanisms
which we do possess, and which do indeed aid us in some problem-
solving situations, but not others (Plotkin, 1993; Papineau, 2000;
Kunda, 2001). It was on the basis of human performance in one such
test, the Wason selection task, that Cosmides (1989) famously
proposed that such problem-solving heuristics are derivative of a
cheater-detection module or algorithm which was an adaptive feature
that had evolved in response to selectionist pressures within social
groups.
While such studies may have proven useful in identifying
domain-specific forms of reasoning, they do not tell us much about the
specific forms of verbal reasoning which constitute argumentation, nor,
by themselves, are they enough to explain the existence of both
analytic and substantial forms of reasoning. What many of these
reasoning-task studies have shown, however, is that there appears to be
a link between those domains responsible for reasoning and those
responsible for verbalization, as well as a link between verbalization
and the so-called ‘Theory of Mind’ ability which allows us to
understand others. Both twin studies ( Reznick, et al 1997; Hughes and
Plomin, 2000) and studies of autistic children (Frith et al, 1994)
indicate not only connections between individual variations of
competence in verbal, empathic, and true-false comprehension, but a
genetic correlation to these abilities. Origgi and Sperber (2000) have
suggested that the link between these seemingly disparate forms of
cognition is that they constitute functional adaptations directed towards
cheating-detection strategies, and Baron-Cohen (1999) has maintained
that the emergence of Theory of Mind was necessary for the emergence
of a sophisticated linguistic system which allowed for shared cognition
between members of a social group. The very basis of human
understanding may therefore originate with the earliest social
organizations, where, in order to survive, individual members of a
group had to be able to understand the intentions of their fellows, and
be able to effectively share knowledge amongst them. Under these
circumstances, verbal reasoning, the ability to argue both effectively
and persuasively and the ability to understand and properly respond to
the communicative intentions of others in one’s social group, would
play a crucial role in individual survival and eventual reproductive
success. The lack of such a faculty would impair their ability to
function within the social unit and to participate in the sharing of
resources, resulting in a low chance of survival and genetic
propagation.
On one level, such accounts not only may help to explain why
we are capable of different forms of reasoning, and the relationship
between verbal reasoning and other forms of cognition, but to help
explain why even the most highly trained and educated among us
persist in making gross errors in judgement based on logical fallacy. In
some instances, they may be caused by the misapplication of certain
domain of reasoning to situations far different from those they have
been adapted for; other common fallacies, such as the appeals to
emotion or authority, may be a result of the close relationship between
true-false reasoning and Theory of Mind as identified by the
aforementioned evolutionary psychologists. Those of us acquainted
with Toulmin’s textbook (co- 
written with Rieke and Janik) An Introduction to Reasoning (1984) will
no doubt recall the student exercises asking the reader to identify the
given fallacies in a particular argument. Future researchers trying to
test adaptationist theories of human reasoning are encouraged to review
these examples, and test their subjects with them, to see what sort of
relationships there may exist between the ability to discern logical
fallacies and other mental skills.
 
CONCLUSION
 
Having reviewed the evidence and implications of a cognitive and
adaptationist approach to the study of argumentation, we may finally
arrive at a new definition of argument under evolutionary psychology:
argumentation is the process by which specific modular domains of
language and reasoning faculties are appropriated and integrated
towards the goals of general problem solving through verbal action. It
is a trait which has presumably evolved primarily as an adaption to
living in a social group, as its primary adaptive function appears to
have been as a means of allowing for the conservation and distribution
of resources within a social group by allowing for mutual
understanding and persuasion within the social unit. That different
arguments share structural similarities is indicative of argument
originating from one or more common cognitive domains, while the
presence of field-dependent traits also indicates that it has long since
been appropriated for purposes beyond its original adaptive functions.
The field of evolutionary psychology is still young. It has not
yet exhausted the list of potential subjects which may fall under its
study, nor has it yet reached a sufficient level of consensus among its
adherents for us to say that there is unity in the field. Anything the
human animal is capable of experiencing is explainable by science, and
must eventually be explained by it. Argumentation is only one of those
uniquely human features which still awaits a proper scientific
explanation.
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